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NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
NORMAN C. THOMASt

N EW

PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING REVIEW

JERSEY'S 1947 Constitution makes judicial review of
administrative determinations available "as of right." Article VI,
Section V, paragraph 4 reads as follows:
Prerogative writs are superseded and, in lieu thereof,
review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior
Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the
Supreme Court, as of right, except in criminal causes where
such review shall be discretionary.

The Supreme Court has promulgated rules governing proceedings in
lieu of prerogative writs.1 These rules establish procedures for the
review of administrative decisions. Review of quasi-judicial or ordermaking action is available in the Superior Court, Appellate Division,
under R.R. 4:88-8. Similar provision for the review of quasi-legislative or rule-making action is made by R.R. 4:88-10. The Supreme
Court has held, however, that the distinction between adjudication
and rule-making is not precise and therefore "litigants should not be
prejudiced where they proceeded in timely fashion under one of the
rules though they should properly have proceeded under the other."'
It is necessary that appeal be taken to the Appellate Division. In
State v. New York Central Railroad Co.,3 the Superior Court, Chant Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan; A.B. 1953,
University of Michigan; M.A. 1958, Ph.D. 1959, Princeton University.

1. R.R. 4:88-1 through R.R. 4:88-15.
2. McKenna v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 19 N.J. 270, 276 (1955).
See also, Carls v. Civil Service Commission, 17 N.J. 215, 219-220 (1955); Bailey
v. Council of the Division of Planning, 22 N.J. 367, 374 (1956).
3. 52 N.J. Super. 206 (Ch. Div. 1958).
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cery Division, held that the proper tribunal in which to challenge an
order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners is the Superior
Court, Appellate Division. The Chancery Division refused, in a suit
initiated by the state to enforce an order of the Board, to pass on the
validity of the order. The railroad could not collaterally attack the
order in the Chancery Division.
The Appellate Division may, upon appeal, direct that additional
evidence be taken before the agency or before a judge of a trial
division "if it appears that the additional evidence is material and that
there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings
before the agency." 4 In all proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs,
the reviewing court is empowered "to review the facts and make independent findings thereon, which power may be exercised by it to
such extent as the interests of justice require." 5
Although the rules in section 4:88 pertain specifically to practice
in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, they also apply to the
Supreme Court. The 1947 Constitution permits matters to be certified
to the Supreme Court for decision while they are pending before the
Superior Court, Appellate Division.6 Upon certification, the Supreme
Court "assumes in their entirety the obligations of the Appellate
Division."'7 The rules of court also provide for the certification of
appeals on petition after final judgment in the Appellate Division8
or a trial court. 9
The Legislature has enacted statutes governing procedures for
appeal of administrative determinations.' 0 However, legislative enactments may not infringe upon the Supreme Court's power to make
rules governing the administration of the courts and practice and
procedure in the courts." Statutory provisions, enacted prior to the
4. R.R. 4:88-9 and R.R. 4:88-11. These rules apply to quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative proceedings, respectively.
5. R.R. 4:88-13.
6. 1947 Constitution, Article VI, Section V, paragraph 1, clause (d).
7. Central Railroad Co. of N.J. v. Department of Public Utilities, 7 N.J. 247,
258 (1951). See also In re New Jersey Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 526-527
(1952).
8. R.R. 1:10-2. Certification of the Appellate Division is not a matter of
right but of discretion and will be allowed only under special circumstances. Included
are: cases involving substantive questions not previously decided by the Supreme
Court; cases where the decision of the Appellate Division is in conflict with other
decisions of that court or the Supreme Court; and cases in which there is a dissent
in the Appellate Division.
9. R.R. 1:10-3. Certification to the trial courts is limited to cases involving
substantial constitutional questions or questions of great public importance that
require prompt adjudication.
10. E.g., R.S. 48:2-46 providing for the review. of decisions and orders of the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners.
11. 1947 Constitution, Article VI, Section II, paragraph 3. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240 (1950) ; Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 5 N.J. 534 (1950).
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adoption of the 1947 Constitution that conflict with subsequently
promulgated court rules are either superseded by the rules, or they
12
must give way so far as is necessary to permit full scope to the rules.
In Winberry v. Salisbury, the Supreme Court established the
supremacy of its rules over any legislative attempts to regulate judicial
procedure. In Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, decided shortly
after Winberry, the court specifically held that the rules governing
proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs were also exclusive:
By the clearest language, the Constitution commits to the
Supreme Court the regulation of the new remedies provided in
lieu of prerogative writs. Review, hearing and relief shall be on
such terms and in such manner as the Supreme Court alone may
provide by rule. In the administration of these remedies, there
is to be no division of authority. It may well be that the framers
of the Constitution were guided by what they considered the
lessons of experience; but, whatever the reason, the provision
is to be read and enforced in accordance with the plain terms of
the grant. No distinction is made between the substantive jurisdiction to afford the relief theretofore available through the prerogative writs and the mode and manner of the exercise of the power.
The whole is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Neither the exercise of the power inherent in the old
Supreme Court by means of the prerogative writs nor the regulation of the remedy is subject to legislative control.13 [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, the Supreme Court exercises exclusive power over judicial
review procedures, including review of administrative decisions. No
statute can supersede or alter any rule of court.
This ruling was not a startling innovation. The former New
Jersey courts exercised broad powers of review under the common
law writ of certiorari.' 4 Writing in 1891, Professor Goodnow stated
that the New Jersey courts "have taken in almost every respect a
more liberal view of the province of the writ [of certiorari] than the
courts of other commonwealths."' 5 Recently, Professor Jaffe asserted
that "New Jersey has a history of the liberal use of prerogative writs,
particularly certiorari, which goes back to the eighteenth century."'"
Both Corpus Juris and Corpus Juris Secundurn, have reported that:
12.
14 N.J.
13.
14.
see the

Winberry v. Salisbury, supra; Ward v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,
Super. 148 (App. Div. 1951).
5 N.J. 534, 541 (1950).
For an excellent summary of the use of certiorari under the former practice,
opinion of the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt in Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298,

304-308 (1949).
15. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari,6 PoL. ScI. Q. 493, 532 (1891).
16. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARV. L. Rgv. 769, 797, n. 260
(1958).
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In New Jersey, the application of the writ [of certiorari]
has been extended further than in almost any state. The writ is
used in that state, at least to some extent, both as a statutory
substitute for a writ of error and as a common law writ. . . . It is
a proper method of redress for an individual whose rights are
invaded by the action of persons clothed with authority and who
exercise that authority illegally. In this respect it is commonly
used to review the acts of municipal or state officers, and it is
often used to review municipal ordinances, in1 7 respect of which
its scope is much broader than in other states.
8
The 1913 case of Public Service Gas Co. v. Public Utility Board,"
in which the former Supreme Court interpreted Section 38 of the
Public Utility Act of 1911,1" is illustrative of the strong certiorari tradition in New Jersey. It also foreshadowed by forty-seven years the holding in Fischerv. Township of Bedminster, (supra), that the Legislature
could not interfere with the rules of court governing proceedings in
lieu of prerogative writs under the 1947 Constitution. Section 38,
now R.S. 48:2-46, provided that the former Supreme Court could set
aside an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners when it
clearly appeared "that there was no evidence before the board to
support the same reasonably or that the same was without the jurisdiction of the board." Upon review, the court stated:

' * * On its face this section confers jurisdiction upon this
court, but a jurisdiction of a limited character, only to be exercised when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before
the board to support their order, or where the order is without
their jurisdiction. If this language be taken literally we should be
powerless in any case within the jurisdiction of the board to set
aside its order if there was any evidence to support it, no matter
how overwhelming the evidence to the contrary might be. It is
needless to say that such a literal construction of section 38 would
bring it into conflict with our constitution. It needs no act of the
legislature to confer on us the power to review the action of an
inferior tribunal, and the legislature cannot limit us in the exer2
cise of our ancient prerogative.
[Emphasis added.]
The present Supreme Court reaffirmed this position as it regarded
2
the statute, R.S. 48:2-46, and proceedings in lieu of prerogative writs. '
The New Jersey courts potentially are able to accord a broader
review of administrative action than the courts of any other Anglo17. 11 C.J. Certiorari § 17 (nn. 90-96) (1917); 14 C.J.S. Certiorari § 9 (nn.
32-39) (1939).
18. 84 N.J.L. 463 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd. 87 N.J.L. 651 (E. & A. 1914).
19. L. 1911, c. 195, § 38. Now R.S. 48:2-46.
20. 84 N.J.L. 463, 466 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
21. Central Railroad Company of N.J. v. Department of Public Utilities, 7 N.J.
247, 259-260 (1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss1/1
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American jurisdiction. As stated by the Supreme Court in 1949,
"Nowhere is the right of judicial review of administrative determinations more strictly enforced than in this state ..... " This situation is
the result of three main factors: the strong certiorari tradition in
New Jersey under the former practice; the broad powers of the courts
to review administrative action by proceedings in lieu of prerogative
writs, as granted by the 1947 Constitution and defined by rules of
court; and the exclusive power of the Supreme Court to supervise
and control review proceedings 2
THE SCOPE OF REVIEW: ANNOUNCED

V. ACTUAL

The announced scope of review is often quite different from that
accorded in practice. 4 The reviewing court is presented with the whole
record, as compiled by the agency, but it seldom announces, in other
than general terms, the extent of its inquiry into the evidence. It is
often necessary to look to the effect of the judicial decision rather
than to the court's opinion to determine the scope of review.
The New Jersey courts usually announce a narrow and limited
scope of review. According to the Superior Court, Appellate Division:
....The court concerns itself with whether there has been
any violation of the State or Federal Constitutions, whether the
result is within and in accordance with the legislative grant and
the standards prescribed thereby, and whether there has been
fraud, bad faith, or manifest abuse of discretion in the sense of
unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious action .... 21
Two decisions of the former Supreme Court are often cited in defining
the scope of review of administrative action. In Fornarotto v. Public
Utility Commissioners,2 6 the court stated that unless the Board arrived
at its decision "by a manifest violation of the law or by a clear abuse
of the discretion vested in it, it is not within the power of this court
to disturb the conclusion thus reached where there is evidence apparent
22. Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 364 (1949).
23. The writer was aided greatly in the preparation of the above section by an
unpublished manuscript by John W. MacDonald, "A Study of Proposed Article 4E;
'Review' of Proposed Title 48A (Sections 48A: 1-145 Thru 48A:1-150) in Connection with Revised Rule of Civil Practice 4:88," August 8, 1958. The writer is
grateful to Mr. Joseph F. Autenrieth for making the manuscript available to him.
24. VOGEL,

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIEs IN NEw JERSEY 116-117 (1941).
25. In re Application of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App.
Div. 1956). Similar statements of the scope of review are found in: In re Larsen,
17 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div. 1952) ; In re Sanders, 40 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div.
1956) ; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 48 N.J.
Super. 216 (App. Div. 1957).
26. 105 N.J.L. 28, 33 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
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upon which it can be reasonably supported." 27 Similarly the Court
declared in the case of Rahway Valley Railroad Co. v. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners,2" that if the Board's determination "has a
reasonable basis in the evidence, and is free from the vice of arbitrariness, this court cannot substitute its judgment therefor."2
The Superior Court, Appellate Division, stated in the case of
New Jersey Power & Light Co. v. Borough of Butler, that it would
not substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, but would "confine its inquiry to an ascertainment of
whether the evidence before the Board furnished a reasonable basis
for its determination. ... " The Supreme Court will not disturb a judgment of the Division of Tax Appeals "unless the evidence is persuasive
that the administrative tribunal erred."'" In reviewing a decision of
the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, stated that:
' * * The scope of appellate review does not possess such
breadth as would permit a disturbance of the administrative finding
unless the court is convinced that the evidence permits of no
reasonable latitude of choice. The court canvasses the record, not
to balance the persuasiveness of the evidence on one side as against
the other, but in order to determine whether a reasonable mind
as adequate to support the conclusion
might accept the evidence
82
and, if so, to sustain it.

These pronouncements are merely restatements of the substantial
evidence rule. The New Jersey rule holds that judicial review of
administrative determinations of fact "must be confined to the question
of whether they are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." 3
27. Cited in: Hohorst v. Marion Bus Transp. Co., 5 N.J. Super. 279, 282
(App. Div. 1949) ; In re Greenville Bus Co., 17 N.J. 131, 144 (1954) ; In re
Marion Bus Transp. Co., 53 N.J. Super. 308, 310 (App. Div. 1958).
28. 127 N.J.L. 164, 167 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
29. Cited in: New Jersey Power & Light Co. v. Borough of Butler, 4 N.J.
Super. 270, 279 (App. Div. 1949); Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines v. Board
of Public Utility Commissioners, 13 N.J. Super. 540, 549 (App. Div. 1951); In re
New Jersey & New York Railroad Co., 23 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1952);
In re Greenville Bus Co., 17 N.J. 131, 138 (1954) ; In re West Jersey & Seashore
Railroad Co., 46 N.J. Super. 543, 546 (App. Div. 1957).
30. 4 N.J. Super. p. 279. See also, In re Greenville Bus Co., 17 N.J. p. 138;
In re West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co., 46 N.J. Super. p. 546.
31. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. City of Newark, 10 N.J. 99, 104 (1952). See
also, Atlantic City Transportation Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 12 N.J.
130, 141 (1953).
32. Hornauer v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 40 N.J. Super. 501,
506 (App. Div. 1956).
33. In re Application of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App.
Div. 1956). See also, In re Plainfield-Union Water Co., 14 N.J. 296, 307 (1954);
In re Central Railroad Co. of N.J., 29 N.J. Super. 32, 38 (App. Div. 1953) ; In
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The courts will not substitute their judgment for that of administrative bodies if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Nowhere have the courts provided a more precise definition of the
scope of review. The substantial evidence rule is usually applied to
limit the extent of the review accorded. However, it is sufficiently
broad to leave the courts with considerable discretion regarding the
scope of review.
In determining the scope of review they will accord an administrative decision, the courts are also guided by the nature of the function.
A broader scope of review is accorded to quasi-judicial as opposed to
quasi-legislative function. 4 The courts recognize that administrative
action often combines legislative, executive, and judicial powers.85
Nevertheless, the distinction they make between quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative functions is meaningful even though it may be somewhat on the fictional side. The courts have held that all action of a
judicial character is covered by the requirements of procedural due
process and they have accorded it a broader scope of review. Also,
if legislative or executive functions of administrative agencies acquire
judicial attributes, the requirements of procedural due process also apply.
The New Jersey courts' sharp differentiation of the quasi-powers
contrasts with the general view that the terms are not susceptible of
such distinction. Professor Davis believes that the "attachment of
separation-of-powers labels is an evasion rather than a solution of the
problem of determining whether or not a trial or other hearing should
be required."'36 In his dissent in the Rubberoid case, the late Justice
Jackson sharply criticized the differentiation of administrative functions:
Courts have differed in assigning a place to these seemingly
necessary bodies in our constitutional system. Administrative
agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or
quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their
functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying "quasi" is implicit with
confession that all recognized classifications have broken down,
and "quasi" is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion
3
as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed. 1
re Sanders, 40 N.J. Super. 477, 483 (App. Div. 1956) ; In re Marion Bus Transp. Co.,
53 N.J. Super. 308, 310 (App. Div. 1958).
34. Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N.J. 99 (1950); Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. New Jersey State Aviation Commission, 2 N.J. 64 (1949).
35. Handlon v. Town of Belleville, supra.

36. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 7.01 (1958).

LAW 254

(1951).

Cf. 1 DAVIS,

37. FTC v. Rubberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952).

ADMINISTRATIVE
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The sharp and meaningful distinction between quasi-powers made in
New Jersey indicates that generalizations about the separation of
powers theory in administrative law are not particularly useful.
The New Jersey courts have occasionally expanded the scope of
review. Leading examples include public utility rate cases 3s and the
Railroad Safety Rules cases. 3" Both classes of cases involve review of
quasi-legislative actions. However, the review accorded was of the
broader type that is usually reserved for quasi-judicial actions.
In the rate cases the courts held that the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners could not fix "just and reasonable" rates without
establishing a rate base. They undertook to "weigh the evidence under
the pertinent legal principles and determine whether the issue of reasonableness had been properly considered and decided."4 ° [Emphasis
added.] Professor Glasser suggests that the broader scope of review
accorded in the rate cases may be explained by two factors: (1) the
judicial nature of rate hearings, which are conducted as adversary
proceedings;41 and (2) the fact that "the quasi-legislative process of
rate-making entails a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of a
'
particularized property right." 42
The rate cases demonstrate the difficulty of using the law-fact
distinction to predict the scope of judicial review. It is almost axiomatic
in New Jersey that appellate courts are the final authority on questions
of law and that administrative findings of fact shall be final if supported
by substantial evidence. However, difficulty arises because most administrative determinations that result in litigation do not involve clearly
distinct questions of law and fact but are by nature mixed questions of
law and fact.4 3 That is, they involve the application of legal concepts,
such as the statutory standard of "just and reasonable," to established
facts. In rate cases the New Jersey courts have given extensive review
to agency rulings of law based on facts determined quasi-legislatively.
The rate cases indicate that the scope of review where mixed
questions are at issue is determined by policy considerations. The
courts were guided by their belief that the "particularized property
rights" and substantial public interests involved should be well protected.
38. Public Service Coordinated Transport v. State, 5 N.J. 196 (1950); Central Railroad Co. of N.J. v. Department of Public Utilities, 7 N.J. 247 (1951).
39. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 14 N.J. 411
(1954); Lehigh & Hudson Railroad Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 14 N.J.
440 (1954).
40. In re New Jersey Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 508 (1952). See also,
Central Railroad Co. of N.J. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 7 N.J. p. 261; Public
Service Coordinated Transport v. State, 5 N.J. 216.
41. Glasser, Administrative Law, 6 RUTURs L. Rnv. 43, 67-68 (1951).
42. Id., at 76.
43. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 874-77 (1951). Cf. 4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISr § 30.01, et. seq. (1958).
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In the Railroad Safety Rules cases, the supreme court extended
the procedural due process requirements for a full hearing to rulemaking by the Board of Public Utility Commissioners. Normally
those requirements are only applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings,
unless statute provides otherwise. In addition, and more significantly,
the court substituted its judgment on certain matters for that of the
Board without providing for remand. In the opinion of one commentator, this was "uncalled for and ominous."44 The broadening of
the normal scope of review of quasi-legislative functions is partly
explained by the high standards of fair play in the administrative
process maintained by the New Jersey courts.
The substitution of judgment without remand constituted judicial
usurpation of administrative functions. It conflicted sharply with the
court's position in the case of In re Plainfield-Union Water Co.,"'
decided only three weeks before the Railroad Safety Rules cases. In
the Plainfield-Union case, the court stated that:
• . . The measures taken to serve the [public] need are in no

respect arbitrary or unreasonable, or an abuse of statutory power
• . . we cannot in these circumstances substitute our judgment

for the specialized judgment of the agency entrusted with the
fulfillment of the legislative policy, for that would constitute the
judicial exercise of the administrative function. .

.

. There is a

vital distinction, related to the constitutional separation of powers,
between the functions of judicial and administrative tribunals....
Care is to be taken that there shall be no encroachment by one
upon the other ......
The court's substitution of its judgment for that of the Board is particularly objectionable where the subject matter involved proposed
safety rules. The Board drafted the rules in the light of past experience
and on the basis of its expert knowledge. The court was inadequately
equipped to determine the reasonableness of the rules.
The courts have imposed high standards of fair play on administrative agencies. They want to know exactly what the agency did
and why it was done.47 Consequently, procedural matters play a major
role in the review of administrative determinations in New Jersey.
44. Moran, General Administrative Law, 9

RUTGERS

L. Rev. 40, 53 (1954).

45. 14 N.J. 296 (1954).
46. 14 N.J. 296, 308 (1954). It should be noted that Justice Heher, who wrote
the Plainfield-Union opinion, dissented in the Railroad Safety Rules cases. He stated
there that "it is of the essence of the doctrine of the separation of powers that the
judiciary may not substitute its judgment on policy for that of the administrative
agency." Heher, J., (dissenting in part), 14 N.J. 411, 438 (1954).
47. In re Plainfield-Union Water Co., 11 N.J. 382, 396 (1953). The court
stated that: "The orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the
grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be 'clearly disclosed and
adequately sustained.' S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)."
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Litigants who cannot obtain review on substantive grounds often are
able to upset or delay agency action because of procedural errors.
However, it should not be concluded that the New Jersey courts
indiscriminately substitute their judgment for that of administrative
agencies. The cases discussed above simply point out that the courts
can, and sometimes do, exercise a broad view of administrative decisions. There are strong indications in administrative review decisions
that the courts generally defer to agency discretion.
Frequently the courts limit the scope of review by asserting that
the Legislature has vested the function of making original findings
of fact and the reaching of policy determinations in administrative
agencies, not the courts.48 The supreme court, for example, has
refused to make original valuations in tax appeal cases "except in
very exceptional circumstances. '49 In reviewitlg administrative decisions, the New Jersey courts seldom exercise their power to make
independent findings of fact. The Superior Court, Appellate Division,
has characterized the independent fact-finding power as a "permissive
role invoked with the greatest circumspection in the necessary interest
of justice and not to be deemed, through speculative perversion of
that rule, the practical equivalent of a trial de novo."5 ° The courts
prefer to remand cases in which the agency has not made adequate
findings of fact. 5' They will, however, resolve purely legal questions themselves. 2
The courts have also accorded a presumption of reasonableness
to administrative findings of fact and to orders and regulations issued by
an administrative body.5 3 The presumption stands until the evidence to
the contrary is "definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity .... -54
48. In re Greenville Bus Co., 17 N.J. 131, 137 (1954) ; In re West Jersey &
Seashore Railroad Co., 46 N.J. Super. 543, 545 (App. Div. 1957). Cf. Elizabeth
v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 7 N.J. Super. 540, 546 (Ch. Div. 1950).
49. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N.J.

418,425 (1952).

50. In re West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co., 46 N.J. Super. 543, 545 (App.

Div. 1956). See also, In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div; 1952); In re

Application of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 1956);
Household Finance Corp. v. Gaffney, 20 N.J. Super. 394 (App. Div. 1952).
51. Bailey v. Council of the Division of Planning, etc., State of New Jersey,
22 N.J. 366 (1956) ; In re Marion Bus Co., 53 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 1958).
52. Atlantic City Transp. Co. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 12 N.J. 130
(1953) ; Abbotts Dairies v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319 (1954); Bailey v. Council of
the Division of Planning, etc., supra.
53. Dutcher v. Department of Civil Service, 7 N.J. Super. 156, 162 (App.
Div. 1950); Welsh Farms, Inc. v. Bergsma, 16 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div.
1951); In re New Jersey Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 508 (1952); Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. City of Newark, 10 N.J. 99, 105 (1952) ; In re Greenville Bus Co.,
17 N.J. 131, 138 (1954) ; In re West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Co., 46 N.J.
Super. 543, 545 (App. Div. 1957) ; Elizabeth Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 508 (1957).
54. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. City of Newark, 10 N.J. 99, 105 (1952).
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The courts will not substitute their judgment for that of an
administrative agency because of a "mere difference of opinion" concerning the persuasiveness of the evidence.55 Nor will they question
the wisdom or prudence of a lawfully made delegation of legislative
power to an administrative body.56 Finally, the courts have stated that
they will not interfere with administrative action that "renders substantial justice." According to the Superior Court, Appellate Division:
Where an executive officer or agency fails to comply with the
directions of a statute governing administrative procedure, but
nevertheless renders substantial justice, the courts will not interfere, except in the unusual situation where it is really essential to
insure future observance of a prescribed safeguard or the vindication of a fundamental principle.5"
They will not impose rigid procedural standards if good sense and the
interests of justice do not so require.5
The Superior Court, Appellate Division, has provided an excellent
description of the nature and scope of judicial review of administrative
action:
The action of an administrative agency . . . should not be
subjected to the same close and technical scrutiny as is frequently
applied in reviewing the judgment of a court. We look at what
was done in the light of the statutory authority conferred; we
inquire in a pragmatic way whether there was notice and fair
hearing on the charges, and we do not interfere with the finding
if it is supported by adequate evidence.. . . 69
Judicial review is concerned with the validity of the agency action
and is based on the record compiled by the agency. It does not involve
a trial de novo in which the court frequently substitutes its judgment
for that of the agency." ° If the court believes that the agency honestly
tried to reach a fair result, that it considered the evidence presented,
and made findings of fact that are adequately supported by the record,
the administrative decision will be upheld.
55. Dutcher v. Department of Civil Service, 7 N.J. Super. 155, 162 (App. Div.
1950); In re Sanders, 40 N.J. Super. 477, 483 (App. Div. 1956); In re Application
of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App. Div. 1956).
56. Ableson's, Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 420
(1950); Welsh Farms, Inc. v. Bergsma, 16 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div.
1951) ; In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 570 (App. Div. 1952).
57. J. Abbott & Son, Inc. v. Holderman, 46 N.J. Super. 46, 56 (App. Div.

1957).
58. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 14 N.J. 411,
427-429 (1954).

59. Middleton v. Division of the New Jersey Real Estate Commission in the

Department of Banking and Insurance, 39 N.J. Super. 214, 219-220 (App. Div. 1956).
60. Kotlarich v. Ramsey 51 N.J. Super. 520, 542 (App. Div. 1958).
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AND CRITIQUE

There is no question of the power of the courts to review questions of agency jurisdiction."' This was a classical ground for review
under the writ of certiorari. It is also elemental that the courts have
final authority over questions of law. 2
The substantial evidence rule governs the scope of review of
administrative findings of fact in New Jersey. The courts usually
accord a narrow scope of review, deferring to the expert judgment of
administrative agencies and determining only whether the agency's
conclusion is supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might consider adequate. The courts seldom exercise their power to accord a
broad scope of review because of their respect for administrative
expertise and the manifest difficulties involved in a broad review of all
63
administrative decisions.

Review has been quite strict in cases involving procedural matters.
The courts have reviewed administrative action far more often on
procedural than on substantive grounds. It is argued that the standards
of fair play imposed on administrative agencies are so strict that they
impair the interest of the public in maintaining efficient and orderly
administrative processes.64 Certainly effective monitoring of administrative procedural abuses is highly desirable, but "wisdom and restraint
are necessary on the part of the reviewing courts to insure that they
refrain from improper invasions into areas of substantive policy." 85
In summary, the courts have generally limited the scope of their
review to four major areas: they will act to curb excessive assumptions
of power, i.e., manifest abuses of discretion; they will speak the final
word on important questions of statutory construction; they will insist
on fair play in administrative proceedings; and they will invalidate
arbitrary or capricious action.
Ultimately, the question of the proper scope of review is a matter
of perspective. Some persons may believe that the review accorded in
a particular case was so narrow that it paved the way for administrative aggrandizement. On the other hand, other observers might conclude that the court's decision constituted an improper usurpation of
61. In re New Jersey & New York Railroad Co., 23 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App.

Div. 1952).
62. Mistakes of law have been reviewable by certiorari since 1839, New Jersey

Road & Tr. Co. v. Suydam, 17 N.J.L. 25.
63. It is highly doubtful thit the courts could handle the increased workload
resulting from broad review of all administrative decisions. Also, the assumption
of administrative and legislative functions would subject the courts to political attacks
and quite possibly damage their prestige.

64. See Davis, New Jersey's Unique Conception of "Fair Play" in the Admitsistrative Process, 10 RUTGERs L. Rev. 660 (1956).
65. Glasser, Administrative Law, 7 RuTIrRS L. Rev. 41, 58 (1952).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss1/1

12

Thomas: New Jersey Administrative Law: The Nature and Scope of Judicial R
FALL

1962]

NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

administrative functions. A broad scope of review is usually regarded
as destructive of the flexibility and adaptability of administrative
processes.6' However, Professor Jaffee has stated that a "Trial de novo
may ... be a way to promote administrative efficiency or to overcome
administrative bias." 6
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

CASES

As distinguished from other administrative decisions, the scope of
review in workmen's compensation cases is quite broad. Unlike review
of other agency determinations, appeals from judgments of the Workingmen's Compensation Division are initially heard in the County
Courts.6" The rules of court provide that the County Court shall
conduct a trial de novo on the record compiled by the agency."e
Appeal may then be taken, as a matter of right, to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, by means of a proceeding in lieu of a prerogative
writ.7" The supreme court may hear appeals from final judgments
of the Appellate Division at its discretion.7 '
Two 1958 decisions of the supreme court illustrate the scope
of review accorded in workmen's compensation cases." In the Russo
case, the court established a "simple formula" defining the scope of
review of factual matters in workmen's compensation proceedings:
It is the duty of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence
and determine whether claimant has sustained the burden of proof
of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment
by a preponderance of the evidence....
From a study of the entire record, it is the function and duty
of the reviewing court to make a determination according to its
considered judgment, and in doing so it is mandatory only to give
due regard to the opportunity of the hearer of the evidence to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses. A finding of fact in the
Division or appellate courts does not lessen the duty of the appeal
court to determine the facts and evaluate them by full investigation and analysis of the evidence so as to adjudge whether the
general finding is consistent therewith, i.e., if upon such total
consideration of the record and views expressed below, it is
believed the judgment both in fact and the applicable law from
which the appeal is taken is correct, it should be affirmed; if the
judgment is erroneous, it should be reversed or modified.7"
66. Ibid.

67. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARv. L. Rzv. 1020, 1054 (1956).
68. R.S. 34:15-66.
69. R.R. 5:2-5(d).
70. R.R. 4:88.
71. R.R. 1:10.
72. Russo v. United States Trucking Corp., 26 N.J. 430 (1958); Ricciardi v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 26 N.J. 445 (1958).
73. 26 N.J. at 435.
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In the Ricciardi case, the court repeated the formula and stated explicitly that " 'Substantial evidence' is not the guiding criterion for
appellate review of factual issues in workmen's compensation proceed'74
ings in this State."

FACTORS THAT CONDITION THE StOPE OF REVIEW

The factors that determine the scope of judicial review of administrative determinations are seldom revealed in court opinions. As
Professor Davis has stated:
* * * The extent of the judicial inquiry in any case depends
not only upon legal formulas and theories but also upon judicial
psychologies. When judges have confidence in agencies' thoroughness and integrity, a strong case is required to move the judges
to dig deeply into the problem, whether the problem is regarded
as one of law or fact or discretion. But when the agency's work
seems slipshod or responsive to ulterior influence, conscientious
judges are likely, irrespective of formulas and theories, to do what
is necessary to assure that justice is done. This observation overother remarks that can be made about the scope
shadows all
75
of review.

A variety of factors have influenced the scope of review accorded
by the New Jersey courts. Each of these factors is, in turn, influenced
by additional considerations and by some or all of the other factors.
A few of the factors are articulated in court opinions, but most of them
must be inferred from the circumstances surrounding each case. Six
primary factors may be noted.
(1) The character of the agency. This factor involves several
considerations. As a rule, if the agency's actions are quasi-judicial,
rather than quasi-legislative, in nature, the courts will exercise a
broader scope of review. 6 Also, if prosecuting and deciding functions
are concentrated in a single individual or agency, the scope of review
will be broadened. 7 The amount of discretion possessed by an agency
is also considered. If the agency exercises a considerable degree of
discretion, the courts will extend the scope of their inquiry. On the
other hand, if the agency operates in a well-established area, has
traditionally exercised broad powers, and has developed a substantial
body of case law, the courts tend to limit the scope of review. The
74. 26 N.J. at 447.
75.

DAVIS,

op. cit. supra, n. 36, at 905-906.

76. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504
(E. & A. 1935); In re Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285 (App.

Div. 1950); Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 14 N.J.

411 (1954).

77. In re Larsen, 17 N.J. Super. 564, 574-75 (App. Div. 1952) (Brennan, J.A.D.,

concurring) ; Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 523 (1954).
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courts usually exercise close scrutiny of agencies that are regulating
new areas of social and economic conduct.7 8 However, the courts have
recognized the need to allow agencies a certain freedom of experimenta79
tion in implementing legislative policy.
(2) The comparative qualifications of the court and the agency
to decide the question. Here the primary considerations are the nature
of the regulatory field and the need for expertness in dealing effectively
with the subject matter. The courts will accord a narrow scope of
review when the regulatory sphere is highly technical and the judges
doubt their ability to cope with it. In such instances, the courts usually
announce their respect for the expertness of the agency. The courts are
disinclined to perform regulatory functions for which they are illprepared because they realize that their performance will be judged by
the political criteria applicable to the exercise of such discretion and
that ultimately "there will be an impairment of the precious prestige
needed to support the prime judicial functions."8 The supreme court
expressed its respect for administrative expertise and its reluctance
to disturb agency determinations based on specialized experience in
the case of Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. v. City
of Hoboken:
• . .Appellate courts should not inject themselves into the
field of original valuation in such cases except in very exceptional
circumstances. . . The valuation of property in railroad use
particularly presents "highly technical" problems for experts ...
The coordination and evaluation of such expert evidence is often
a matter of considerable difficulty because of the unique problems
entailed in the valuation of properties in railroad use and the
increment in value, if any, resulting from the assemblage and
consolidation of several tracts. . . .The task of coordination and
evaluation of such evidence has been expressly committed by the
Legislature to the Division of Tax Appeals, a body contemplated
to bring an informed judgment from specialized experience to
the nice balancing and ultimate resolution of the many complex
factors involved ... 81
In contrast, the courts are inclined to broaden the scope of review
if they feel that a matter is not closely related to the agency's sphere
of competence. They will also accord a broad scope of review if they
consider the matter to be related to their own judicial expertness, e.g.,
common law, constitutional law, ethical questions, etc., or if they can
78. Van Riper v. Traffic Telephone Workers, 2 N.J. 335, 354 (1949).
79. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers, 5 N.J. 354.

371 (1950).
80. Jaffe, op. cit. supra, note 67, at 1055.
81. 10 N.J. 418, 425 (1952).
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easily educate themselves about the subject.
has stated that:

The Supreme Court

• ..while it has always been recognized that due deference must

be accorded to the expertise of the administrative official, the
degree of deference to be accorded in a particular case must also
depend on whether the issue clearly involves expertise. Since
cases involving the disciplining of a public officer or employee
ordinarily involve no expertise, we are returned to the fundamental
premise of substantial justice as the standard for judicial review.8 2
(3) The effect of the agency's action on personal liberty and
property rights. Where administrative action imposes penalties on individuals in the form of personal restraints or loss or suspension of
the right to earn a living,8" the courts will enlarge the scope of review.
They are also likely to accord a broad scope of review where substantial property rights are involved, e.g., public utility rate cases. According to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, ".

.

. the agency will not

be considered to have the power to curtail drastically important rights
of the citizen, whether as regards person or property, unless the
legislative intention to grant such power is plainly manifest."8 4
In all cases, the courts will intervene to protect individuals and
the public from arbitrary or capricious administrative action. The
courts are likely to review order-making action affecting a single
person more carefully than rule-making action that uniformly affects
a large group. However, they always consider the effect of the action
on the public interest.
(4) The desirability of having the court or the agency make the
final decision in a case. This factor depends largely upon the importance of the issue. If a highly sensitive public question is involved, the
prestige of a judicial decision is often valuable. It will place future
administrative action in the same area on a more sound basis. It is
often desirable, in the early stages of an agency's existence, to obtain
judicial approval or correction of the new propositions of law established by the agency. Thus, the courts hope to provide clearly defined
standards so that the regulation may be conducted without frequent
recourse to the courts. It should be remembered, however, that such
judicial efforts sometimes have the opposite effect, as was the case
with Smyth v. Ames, 5 which complicated the problem of public utility
rate regulation for almost fifty years.
82. Russo v. Governor of State of New Jersey, 22 N.J. 156, 169 (1956).
83. Ibid., Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498 (1954). These cases involved a
disciplinary proceeding and the loss of a liquor license.
84. In re Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super. 285, 302 (App. Div. 1950).
85. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss1/1

16

Thomas: New Jersey Administrative Law: The Nature and Scope of Judicial R

1962]

FALL

NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

An additional consideration is whether judicial review will either
impair administrative efficiency or place an undue burden on the courts.
Extensive judicial review may render administrative regulation ineffective. Also, an over-eager disposition to intervene can "encourage
appeals in an area in which the public interest demands expeditious
solution of the controversy."" 6
The courts are unwilling to substitute their judgment for that of
administrative agencies if it appears that such action might violate
the principle of separation of powers.8 7 In many cases they state explicitly that the Legislature has made the agency and not the courts
responsible for the regulatory function. 8 They usually refuse to exercise their independent fact-finding power, but prefer, instead, to remand
the matter to the agency.89
(5)
The legislative purpose in enacting the regulatory statute.
If it clearly appears that the Legislature intended to commit the
question to administrative discretion, the scope of review will be
narrowly defined, probably in terms of the substantial evidence rule.
However, if the court believes that the Legislature wishes to rely
on substituted judicial judgment, as in workmen's compensation cases,
it will conduct broad review, possibly including a trial de novo.
The degree of judicial agreement or disagreement with the legislative purpose conditions the scope of review. If the judges sympathize
with the legislative design, they are more likely to uphold administrative action taken in pursuance of it. If their disagreement with the
legislative purpose is sufficiently strong, they may either invalidate
the administrative action on the ground that it lacked a rational basis
or substitute their own independent judgment.
Legislative purpose is one of the more important factors conditioning the scope of judicial review. Professor Jaffe maintains that
it should be the primary factor, even though the test it provides depends
on the application of the particular judge." The Superior Court,
Appellate Division, has stated that:
...nowadays, in the interpretation of all classes of statutes,
a greater emphasis than formerly is put on the legislative intent,
to be sought in the statute as a whole. This careful attention to
the policy of the legislation leads to a more liberal construction
of the powers of administrative agencies."
86. Russo v. United States Trucking Corp., 26 N.J. 430, 441 (1958)

(Wein-

traub, C.J., concurring).

87. In re Plainfield-Union Co., 14 N.J. 296 (1954).
88. Supra, n. 49.
89. Supra, n. 50.
90. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. Rzv. 239, 261-262 (1955).
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(6) The court's appraisalof the competency of the agency. This
is an important, but seldom articulated factor. Judicial confidence in
an agency derives in large part from past performance. If the agency
has demonstrated its expertness and its ability to render clear and
unambiguous rules and orders the courts usually will defer to its discretion. They are most favorably influenced by agency records that
include all of the evidence taken and considered in reaching the decision
and by logical, rationally-based decisions.
The degree to which an agency observes the standards of fair
play also influences judicial confidence in it. The courts will exercise
broad and sweeping powers of review if an agency has neglected or
disregarded the requirements of procedural due process. Decisions
made without adequate hearing on the basis of ex parte consultations
are highly suspect.
In the final analysis, the scope of review is a question of the
individual judge's estimate of the situation. In any one case, some or
all of the factors discussed above will influence the judge who takes
whatever action he thinks is just and right. A factor that is important
in one case, such as legislative intent, may appear insignificant in
another. Certain factors will continue to predominate over others.
Chief Justice Weintraub summarized the situation in his concurring
opinion in Russo v. United States Trucking Corporation:
* ' * I incline to believe that a judge will do what he thinks
he should, no matter how we try to corral him. Whether he will
disturb the findings depends upon what is really pivotal in the case
as he sees it ....

The patterns vary. The most that can be said is

that an appellate judge should and will sustain the factual findings
unless he is persuaded upon 92the sundry aspects of the case that
the trier of facts was wrong.

There exists, then, a particular need for judicial self-restraint in
the review of administrative actions. As Davis stated, "the strongest
judge may be the one whose personal preferences concerning substantive results have the least effect upon the scope of his inquiry."'' At
the same time, however, there is a need for the courts to guide "the
excessive procedural hegemony of many agencies" into "lines of more
effective democratic responsibility.

9' 4

In general, the New Jersey

courts meet both of these requirements. Theyr restrain themselves from
unwarranted invasions of substantive policy areas while maintaining
a constant guard against administrative aggrandizement.
92. 26 N.J. 430, 444 (1958).
93. DAVIS, op. cit. supra n. 36, at 927.

94. Glasser, op. cit. supra n. 65, at 72.
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